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Abstract
The ﬁrst step in the veriﬁcation of cryptographic protocols is to decide the intruder deduction problem, that
is the vulnerability to a so-called passive attacker. We extend the Dolev-Yao model in order to model this
problem in presence of the equational theory of a commutative encryption operator which distributes over
the exclusive-or operator. The interaction between the commutative distributive law of the encryption and
exclusive-or oﬀers more possibilities to decrypt an encrypted message than in the non-commutative case,
which imply a more careful analysis of the proof system. We prove decidability of the intruder deduction
problem for a commutative encryption which distributes over exclusive-or with a DOUBLE-EXP-TIME
procedure. And we obtain that this problem is EXPSPACE-hard in the binary case.
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1 Introduction
Today, the number of interactive services proposed on the Internet is exploding.
Most of them use cryptographic protocols to guarantee some level of security. They
can be seen as relatively simple programs which are executed in an unsecure envi-
ronment. There are diﬀerent approaches for modeling cryptographic protocols and
analyzing their security properties. One of them is the approach of Dolev and Yao
[12], which models the attacker capabilities by a deduction system. This model is
often used to analyze the security of protocols against a passive attacker, i.e an in-
truder which obtains information by eavesdropping on the communications between
honest participants and deduces some information from these messages. The ques-
tion whether a passive attacker gets a certain information from observed messages
on the network is called the intruder deduction problem.
1 This work was partially supported by the DGA (Contrat n◦ 06 60 019 00 470 75 01), the research program
ACI-SI Rossignol, and the project RNTL PROUVÉ (n◦ 03 V 360).
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Algebraic Properties: Usually the capabilities of the intruder are based on
the so-called perfect cryptography assumption, i.e. it is impossible to obtain any
information about an encrypted message without knowing the exact key necessary
to decrypt this message. Unfortunately, this perfect cryptography assumption is
too idealistic: There are protocols which can be proved secure under the perfect
cryptography assumption, but which are in reality insecure since an attacker can
use properties of the cryptographic primitives in combination with the protocol
rules to learn some secret informations (see [2] for a survey). It is necessary to relax
this assumption by increasing the deductive power of the intruder. One possibility
is to add the capability to take into account some algebraic properties to model an
intruder in a more realistic way, which may ﬁnd new attacks.
Related Work: Solutions to the intruder deduction problem modulo an equa-
tional theory are known for the cases of modular exponentiation [4,17], of exclusive-
or, of Abelian groups [6,3], of a homomorphism symbol alone [7], and of combinations
of homomorphism and one of the operators of exclusive-or or Abelian groups [13,9].
Another result [5] proves that the so-called active intruder with just a commuta-
tive encryption and the classical Dolev-Yao model is decidable. We have already
studied in [14] the intruder deduction problem for a non-commutative encryption
which distributes over the exclusive-or symbol, denoted ⊕. A natural question is to
consider now the case of commutative encryption, i.e. {{u}k1}k2 = {{u}k2}k1, for
instance the encryption RSA. Notice that in this case the equational theories of the
⊕ operation and of the commutative encryption operation which distributes over the
exclusive-or symbol, i.e. {x ⊕ y}k = {x}k ⊕ {y}k, are not disjointed because they
share the encryption symbol function, hence the combination algorithm proposed
in [8] can not be applied.
Our contribution: We investigate the intruder deduction problem with the
equational theory of a commutative encryption, i.e. {{u}k1}k2 = {{u}k2}k1 which
distributes over the exclusive-or i.e. {x⊕y}k = {x}k⊕{y}k, where exclusive-or has
the properties of Associativity, Commutativity, Unity and Nilpotency. The interac-
tion between the commutative distributive law of the encryption and exclusive-or of-
fers more possibilities to decrypt an encrypted message than in the non-commutative
case. The commutativity of encryption requires to deﬁne new notions and to ﬁnd
new proof transformations, since one encrypted message can be partially decrypted
by several diﬀerent keys. In the non-commutative case for solving this problem
it is enough to construct some normalization of proofs where applications of the
exclusive-or rules are applied as early as possible. In the case of the commutative
encryption, we have to apply as early as possible the decryption and after as early
as possible the exclusive-or. This raises some diﬃculties that we solve by character-
izing new proof notions, constructing transformations to pass from one to another,
designing a right set of subterms and proving a normalization of proof to get the
result. We obtain a decision procedure in DOUBLE-EXP-TIME for the intruder
deduction problem with the equational theory of the exclusive-or and commutative
distributive encryption over this operator. We prove also in the particular case of
the binary proofs that the intruder deduction problem is EXPSPACE-hard for this
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equational theory.
Plan: We recall in Section 2 usual notions required in the rest of the paper.
In Section 3 we introduce the extended Dolev-Yao model of intruder capacities. In
Section 4 we present the generalization of McAllester’s locality algorithm. In the
rest we introduce all required notions to show the locality result in Section 9. Finally
in Section 10 we present the binary case and conclude in Section 11.
2 Preliminaries
We refer the reader to [10,1] for an overview of rewriting.
Let Σ be a signature. T (Σ,X) denotes the set of terms over the signature Σ and
the set of variables X, that is the smallest set such that: (i) X ⊆ T (Σ,X), (ii) if
t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (Σ,X), and f ∈ Σ has arity n ≥ 0, then f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T (Σ,X). We
abbreviate T (Σ, ∅) as T (Σ); elements of T (Σ) are called Σ-ground terms. The set of
variables occurring in a term t is denoted by V(t).
The set of occurrences of a term t is deﬁned recursively as O(f(t1, . . . , tn)) =
{} ∪
⋃
i=1...n i · O(ti). For instance, O(f(a, g(b, x))) = {, 1, 2, 21, 22}. The size |t|
of a term t is deﬁned as its number of occurrences, that is |t| = cardinality(O(t)).
We extend the notion of size to a set of terms T by |T | = Σt∈T |t|. If o ∈ O(t) then
the subterm of t at position o is deﬁned recursively by:
• t |= t
• f(t1, . . . , tn) |j·o= tj |o
A term r is a subterm of a term t if r is a subterm of t at some position of t.
A Σ-equation is a pair (l, r) ∈ T (Σ,X), commonly written as l = r. The relation
=E generated by a set of Σ-equations E is the smallest congruence on T (Σ) that
contains all ground instances of all equations in E.
A Σ-rewriting system R is a ﬁnite set of so-called rewriting rules l → r where
l ∈ T (Σ,X) and r ∈ T (Σ,V(l)). A term t is in normal form if there is no term s
with t → s. If t →∗ s and s is a normal form then we say that s is a normal form
of t, and write s = t ↓.
Let T be a set of terms, the mapping S : T → T is idempotent if for every
X ⊆ T : S(S(X)) = S(X). The mapping S is monotone if for all X,Y ⊆ T : if
X ⊆ Y then S(X) ⊆ S(Y ). S is transitive if for all X,Y,Z ⊆ T , X ⊆ S(Y ) and
Y ⊆ S(Z) implies X ⊆ S(Z). The following Proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 2.1 Let S be a mapping from sets of terms to sets of terms. If S is
idempotent and monotone then S is transitive.
3 A Dolev-Yao Model for Rewriting Modulo AC
We consider the classic model of deduction rules introduced by Dolev and Yao [12]
in order to model the deductive capabilities of a passive intruder. We present an
extension of this model with the equational theory XCDE (eXclusive-or with a
Commutative Distributive Encryption over ⊕).
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The knowledge of the intruder is represented by terms built over a ﬁnite signature
Σ = {〈·, ·〉, {·}·,⊕} unionmulti Σ0, where Σ0 is a set of constant symbols. The term 〈u, v〉
represents the pairing of the two terms u and v. The term {u}K represents the
encryption of the term u by a ﬁnite multiset of keys K and we consider that {u}∅ = u.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider symmetric commutative encryption, all results
can be extended to the asymmetric case.
The equational theory XCDE is represented by the following convergent rewriting
system R: 0 ⊕ x → x; x⊕ x → 0; {x ⊕ y}z → {x}z ⊕ {y}z ;{0}z → 0 (the last rule
is required to get the conﬂuence of R). R is terminating and conﬂuent modulo
associativity and commutativity of ⊕, and such that for all terms t, s ∈ T (Σ) we
have that t =E s if and only if t ↓ =AC s ↓. The deduction system of Figure 1
corresponds to the deductive capabilities of an attacker considering the equational
theory XCDE.
(A)
u ∈ T
T  u ↓
(P )
T  u T  v
T  〈u, v〉 ↓
(C)
T  u T  K
T  {u}K ↓
(D)
T  r T  K
T  u ↓
if r =E {u}K
(UL)
T  r
T  u ↓
if 〈u, v〉 = r
(UR)
T  r
T  v ↓
if 〈u, v〉 = r
(GX)
T  u1 . . . T  un
T  u1 ⊕ . . .⊕ un ↓
Fig. 1. A Dolev-Yao proof system working on normal forms by a rewrite system R modulo AC for a com-
mutative encryption, where K = {kα11 , . . . , k
αn
n }is a multiset of keys, where αi represents the multiplicity
of the keys ki in K.
This proof system is composed of the following rules: (A) the intruder may use
any term which is in his initial knowledge, (P ) the intruder can build a pair of two
messages, (UL),(UR) he can extract each member of a pair, (C) he can encrypt a
message u with a multiset K of keys, (D) if he knows a multiset K of keys then
he can decrypt a message encrypted by K. Let K = {kα11 , . . . , k
αn
n } be a multiset
of keys, the sequent T  K is short for: α1 times the sequent T  k1, . . . , αn
times the sequent T  kn. Sometimes, we shall annotate the rules (C) and (D) by
the multiset of keys that they use, yielding rules (CK) and (DK). Because of the
algebraic properties of the ⊕ operator, we add a family of rules (GX) which allows
the intruder to build a new term from an arbitrary number of already known terms
by using the ⊕ operator.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A proof P of T  w is a ﬁnite tree such that:
• every leaf of P is labeled by v ∈ T .
• every node of P with n children (n ≥ 1) labeled with T  v1, . . . , T  vn, is labeled
with T  v such that
T  v1 . . . T  vn
T  v
(R) is an instance of the rule of Figure 1.
• the root of P is labeled with T  w.
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A sub-proof P ′ of a proof P is a sub-tree of P . The size of a proof P is the number
of nodes in P , denoted by |P |.
In fact, this proof system is equivalent in deductive power to a variant of the
system in which terms are not automatically normalized, but in which arbitrary
equational proofs are allowed at any moment of the deduction. The equivalence of
the two proof systems has been shown in [7] without AC axioms; and in [13] this
has been extended to the case of a rewrite system modulo AC. In the following, all
terms are normalized and we omit the normalization symbol ↓.
4 Locality Result and Complexity
Our starting point is the locality technique introduced by McAllester [15]. He con-
siders deduction systems which are represented by ﬁnite sets of Horn clauses. He
shows that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to decide the deducibility of a
term w from a ﬁnite set of terms T if the deduction system has the so-called locality
property. A deduction system has the locality property if any proof can be trans-
formed into a local proof, that is a proof where all nodes are syntactic subterms of
T ∪ {w}. The idea of the proof is to check existence of a local proof by a saturation
algorithm which computes all syntactic subterms of T ∪{w} that are deducible from
T. In [14] we generalize McAllester’s approach, here we just recall the deﬁnition of
a local proof and the locality Theorem. In the rest of the paper we denote T ∪ {w}
by T,w.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let S be a function which maps a set of terms to a set of terms. A
proof P of T  w is S-local if all nodes are labeled by some T  v with v ∈ S(T,w).
A proof system is S-local if whenever there is a proof of T  w then there is also a
S-local proof of T  w.
Theorem 4.2 Let S be a function mapping a set of terms to a set of terms, and P
a proof system. Let T be a set of terms, let w be a term and let n be |T,w|. If:
(i) one-step deducibility of S  u in P is decidable in time g(|S, u|) for any term
u and set of terms S,
(ii) the set S(T,w) can be constructed in time f(n),
(iii) P is S-local,
then provability of T  w in the proof system P is decidable in time f(n) + f(n) ∗
f(n) ∗ g(f(n)) (non-deterministic if one of (ii), (i) is non-deterministic).
We say that u is one-step deducible from a set of hypotheses H if there exists
an instance
T  r1 . . . T  rn
T  r
(R) of some deduction rule such that r = u and
ri ∈ H. The one-step deducibility is decidable in polynomial time for the equational
theory XCDE. Observe ﬁrst that all rules of deduction of Figure 1 are binary except
the rule (GX) (rule (CK) (resp. (DK)) are shorts for ﬁnite number of consecutive
applications of rule (Cki) (resp. (Dki)). For all these binary rules proving the
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one-step deducibility takes a polynomial time. For the rule (GX) the problem can
reduce to solve system of equations in Z/2Z as in [14]. We illustrate the idea of this
reduction, with the following example.
Example 4.3 Let T = {a1⊕a2⊕a3, a1⊕a4, a2⊕a4} and w = a1⊕a2, where every
ai contains no ⊕. We introduce one numerical variable x0, x1, x2 for each element
of T :
x0 for a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ a3
x1 for a1 ⊕ a4
x2 for a2 ⊕ a4
For every element of the sum we create an equation, we get the equation system:
a1 : x0 ⊕ x1 = 1
a2 : x0 ⊕ x2 = 1
a3 : x0 = 0
a4 : x1 ⊕ x2 = 0
The system has a solution over Z/2Z if and only if w is deducible in one-step from
T by (GX). In this example the system has a solution: x0 = 0, x1 = 1, x2 = 1.
In the rest of the paper, to prove the locality of the deduction system, we deﬁne
a new notion of subterms (Deﬁnition 5.7) and some transformations of proof which
enable us to prove that any proof can be transformed into a normal proof. Hence
we prove that a normal proof is in fact a local proof in Theorem 9.1, yielding the
decidability of the intruder deduction problem, using Theorem 4.2.
5 Terms and Subterms
Deﬁnition 5.1 Let u be a term in normal form, u is headed with ⊕ if u is of the
form u1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ un with n > 1. Otherwise u is not headed with ⊕. A term u in
normal form is called headed with {.}K if u is of the form u = {t}K . Otherwise u is
not headed with {.}K . We deﬁne the function atoms(u):
• If u = u1 ⊕ . . .⊕ un, where each of the ui is not headed with ⊕, then atoms(u) =
{u1, . . . , un}. The ui’s are called the atoms of u.
• If u is not headed with ⊕ then atoms(u) = {u}.
Example 5.2 t1 = u ⊕ 〈v,w〉 is headed with ⊕, but t2 = 〈u, v ⊕ w〉 is not, hence
atoms(t1) = {u, 〈v,w〉} and atoms(t2) = {t2}.
The deﬁnition of atoms is generalized to sets of terms T in normal form by
setting atoms(T ) :=
⋃
t∈T atoms(t). According to the deﬁnition, the function atoms
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is monotone and idempotent. We denote by P[K] the set of all the partitions of the
set K.
Deﬁnition 5.3 The set of syntactic subterms of a term t is the smallest set S(t)
such that:
(i) t ∈ S(t).
(ii) if 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(t) then u, v ∈ S(t).
(iii) if {u}K ∈ S(t) and K = {k
α1
1 , . . . , k
αp
p } then u ∈ S(t) and ki ∈ S(t) for all i,
1 ≤ i ≤ p.
(iv) if u = u1 ⊕ . . .⊕ un ∈ S(t) then atoms(u) ⊆ S(t).
Example 5.4 If u = {a}k1,k2,k3 i.e. the term a is encrypted by the keys k1, k2 and
k3 then
S(u) = {u, a, k1, k2, k3, {a}k1 , {a}k2 , {a}k3 , {a}k1,k2, {a}k2,k3, {a}k1,k3}, for instance
the term {a}k1 comes from the point (iii) of the previous deﬁnition with K =
{k2, k3}.
The deﬁnition of S is extended to a set T of terms in normal form by setting
S(T ) :=
⋃
t∈T S(t). Since the encryption is commutative, the number of subterms
of S(T ) is exponential in the size of the set of keys of T (consider all the possible
combinations of keys for an encrypted term). In the deﬁnition of S(t) we do not
take care of the distributivity of encryption. Because we work only on normal forms
the notion of a syntactic subterm ignores the fact that the term {a}K⊕{b}K⊕{c}K
is equal to {a⊕ b⊕ c}K , and that a⊕ b⊕ c should be considered to be a subterm of
{a}K ⊕ {b}K ⊕ {c}K and also all sums encrypted with the set P[K].
Deﬁnition 5.5 For any term t, ST (t) is the smallest set such that:
• S(t) ⊆ ST (t).
• If n > 1, K = {kα11 , . . . , k
αp
p } and {u1}K⊕. . .⊕{un}K ∈ ST (t) then u1⊕. . .⊕un ∈
ST (t).
By deﬁnition S(t) ⊆ ST (t). The deﬁnition is extended to a set T of terms in
normal form by setting ST (T ) :=
⋃
t∈T ST (t). As in Deﬁnition 5.3, Deﬁnition 5.5
considers also all the possible combinations of keys for an encrypted sum of terms.
Proposition 5.6 For any set of terms M ⊆ TΣ, we have:
• atoms(M) ⊆ S(M).
• atoms(ST (M)) ⊆ ST (M).
• S(S(M)) = S(M) and ST (ST (M)) = ST (M).
Proof. Obvious from the deﬁnitions of S, atoms and ST . 
Deﬁnition 5.7 Deﬁne S⊕ as all combinations of terms of ST (T ) by ⊕:
S⊕(T ) :=
{
(
⊕
s∈M
s) ↓ |M ⊆ ST (T )
}
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Note that the size of S⊕ is double-exponential in the size of T and ST (T ) ⊆
S⊕(T ): one exponential for the computation of S(T ) ⊆ ST (T ) and the second
exponential for all the partial sums.
Proposition 5.8 Let A and B be two sets of terms in normal form, the mappings
S, ST and S⊕ are monotone and have the property:
• S(A ∪B) = S(A) ∪ S(B).
• ST (A ∪B) = ST (A) ∪ ST (B).
• S⊕(A) ∪ S⊕(B) ⊆ S⊕(A ∪B).
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnitions of S(T ), ST (T ) and S⊕(T ).
Remark: Let A = {a} and B = {b}, S⊕(A) = {0, a} and S⊕(B) = {0, b} then
S⊕(A) ∪ S⊕(B) = {0, a, b} ⊆ S⊕(A ∪ B) = {0, a ⊕ b, a, b} but S⊕(A) ∪ S⊕(B) =
S⊕(A ∪B).
Lemma 5.9 Let T be a set of terms then ST (S⊕(T )) = S⊕(T ).
Proof. By deﬁnition 5.5, S⊕(T ) ⊆ ST (S⊕(T )). We prove the converse inclusion
by induction on the number of applications of the rule for ⊕ in the construction
of ST (S⊕(T )) (step (ii) in Deﬁnition 5.5). Let u ∈ ST (S⊕(T )), and let n be the
number of applications of the rule for ⊕. By induction hypothesis, we assume that
each term u′ ∈ ST (S⊕(T )) obtained with less than n applications of the rule for ⊕
is in S⊕(T ).
Base case n = 0: u ∈ ST (v) for some v ∈ S⊕(T ), where v = v1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ vp
and all vi ∈ ST (T ). If u = v then u ∈ S⊕(T ). Otherwise u = v. In this case
u ∈ S(vi) ⊆ ST (vi) for some i (since vi ∈ ST (T ) and S(ST (T )) = ST (T )). Since
v ∈ S⊕(T ) there exists a ti ∈ T such that vi ∈ ST (ti). Therefore vi ∈ ST (ti) ⊆ ST (T )
with ti ∈ T , hence u ∈ ST (ST (T )) = ST (T ) ⊆ S⊕(T ) by idempotence of ST .
Induction step: let u = u1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ un be obtained from {u1}K ⊕ . . . ⊕ {un}K ∈
ST (S⊕(T )). By induction hypothesis {u1}K ⊕ . . . ⊕ {un}K ∈ S⊕(T ). Hence there
exists a partition I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Iq = {1, . . . , n} such that for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ q,
wj = ⊕i∈Ij{ui}K ∈ ST (tj). Hence, ⊕i∈Ijui ∈ ST (tj) by deﬁnition of ST . As a
consequence, u ∈ S⊕(T ). 
Proposition 5.10 Let M be a set of terms then S⊕(S⊕(M)) = S⊕(M). The map-
pings S, ST and S⊕ are transitive.
Proof. The ﬁrst point is a consequence of Lemma 5.9 and Proposition 5.6. The
second is a consequence of the ﬁrst point and Propositions 2.1, 5.6 and 5.8. 
All these results will be used implicitly in the rest of the paper.
6 Diﬀerent Kinds of Proofs
After a description of the diﬀerent notions of subterms, we now introduce the dif-
ferent proof’s characterizations which is a crucial ingredient in the demonstration of
the locality result.
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Deﬁnition 6.1 Let P be a proof of T  w. P is ﬂat if there is no (GX) (respectively
(C) and (D)) rule immediately above another (GX) (respectively (C) and (D)) rule.
P is simple if (1) each node T  v occurs at most once on each branch, (2) each
node T  v occurs at most once as hypothesis of a rule (GX), (3) there is no
consecutive application of (CK) and (DK ′) (in either order) if K ∩K
′ = ∅.
Any proof can be transformed into a simple proof since we can always cut some
branch or piece of branch of the proof. In any proof we can always merge two
consecutive applications of a rule (CK) (respectively (DK) and (GX)) and get a ﬂat
proof. Hence a ﬂat proof can always be transformed into a ﬂat and simple proof.
Proposition 6.2 Let K and K ′ be two sets of keys such that K ∩K ′ = ∅. Applying
the rule (DK) to a term u and then the rule (CK ′) yields the same result as applying
the rule (CK ′) to u and then the rule (DK).
Proof. The fact that K ∩K ′ = ∅ is the key of this result. 
Intuitively, in a D-eager proof the (D) rule is applied as early as possible and in
a ⊕-eager proof the (GX) rule is applied as early as possible.
Deﬁnition 6.3 Let P be a proof of T  w. P is a D-eager proof if: (1) there is no
hypothesis of a rule (GX) which is headed with {.}K and a rule (DK ′) just after a
(GX) such that K∩K ′ = ∅, (2) there is no (C) just above rule (D). P is a ⊕-eager
proof if all the rules (CKi) immediately above a (GX) in P have Ki ∩Kj = ∅ for all
i, j such that i = j.
We reﬁne the notion of S-local proof by S(T )-local, where T is the set of terms
on which S is applied. A normal proof consists of initial subproofs which are
S⊕(T )-local, followed by a proof tree consisting of the rules (GX), (C), (P ) only.
Deﬁnition 6.4 Let P be a proof of T  u. P is a normal proof if :
• either u ∈ S⊕(T ) and P is an S⊕(T )-local proof,
• or P = C[P1, . . . , Pn] where every proof Pi is a normal proof of some T  vi with
vi ∈ S⊕(T ) and the context C is built using the inference rules (P ), (C), (GX)
only.
7 Transformations of Proofs
We modify by successive transformations a proof into a simple ﬂat proof, then into
a simple ﬂat D-eager proof, next into a simple ﬂat D-eager ⊕-eager proof and
ﬁnally into a normal proof. With all these transformations we ﬁrst apply the rule
of decryption, then we make the sum with the (GX) rule to simplify or construct
terms to get a normal proof.
Lemma 7.1 Let P be a simple and ﬂat proof of T  w. Then there exists a proof
P ′ of T  w such that P ′ is a simple, ﬂat and D-eager proof.
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Proof. Let P be a simple and ﬂat proof of T  w. We transform this proof into a
simple, ﬂat and D-eager proof of T  w by induction on the number of nodes of P .
We consider the last rule of the proof, if it is:
• (A): the result holds.
• (GX), (P ), (UR), (UL), (C): we apply the induction hypothesis on all direct
sub-proofs.
• (DK2): we always apply the induction hypothesis on the key part of the rule
(DK2), for the encrypted part we consider the rule above (DK2) is :
· (A), (P ), (UR), (UL) we apply the induction hypothesis on all direct sub-proofs.
· (C): we can switch the two rules using Proposition 6.2 and simplicity (to get a
D-eager proof). Hence we apply the induction hypothesis on the sub-proofs.
· (GX) if all encrypted hypotheses of the (GX) are encrypted by sets of keys Ki
such that Ki∩K2 = ∅ then we apply the induction hypothesis on the sub-proofs.
Otherwise we consider that the hypotheses of the rule (GX) can be split into
smaller sums which all give an encrypted term and we apply the transformation
described in Figure 2. In certain cases some additional transformations are
required to preserve simplicity: we cut the same hypotheses of the rule (GX)
or branch of the proof for the new nodes introduced. Moreover if a rule (GX)
has just one hypothesis, this rule can be deleted. Since K2 ∩ K1 = ∅ and
n ≥ 2, the size of the initial proof is Σi=ni=1 |πBi | + |πK2| + 2 is greater or equal
than Σi=n1i=1 |πBi | + |πK2∩K1| + 2 the size of this sub-proof, hence we apply the
induction hypothesis on the sub-proof ended by the rule (DK2∩K1).

Proposition 7.2 The transformations of proofs given in Figures 3 and 4 decrease
the number of nodes of the initial proof.
Proof. We denote by πx the subproof of P with root T  x. These transformations
transform a proof with some hypotheses and a conclusion into a proof of the same
hypotheses and the same conclusion. Figure 3: It is obvious.
Figure 4: The number of nodes of the initial proof is:
αI = Σ
i=m
i=1 |πzi |+ |πx1|+ |πx2|+ |πK1|+ |πK2 |+ 3
The number of nodes of the transformed proof is:
αT = Σ
i=m
i=1 |πzi |+ |πx1|+ |πx2|+ |πK1\K2|+ |πK2\K1 |+ |πK1∩K2|+ 5
Observe that |πK1| = |πK1∩K2 |+ |πK1\K2 | and |πK2| = |πK1∩K2|+ |πK2\K1|.
αI − αT = |πK1 |+ |πK2| − |πK1\K2| − |πK2\K1 | − |πK1∩K2| − 2
= |πK1∩K2|+ |πK1\K2 |+ |πK2 | − |πK1\K2 | − |πK2\K1 | − |πK1∩K2 | − 2
= |πK1∩K2|+ |πK2\K1 | − |πK2\K1 | − 2
= |πK1∩K2| − 2
Since K1 ∩K2 = ∅, hence |πK1∩K2| ≥ 2 and the number of nodes is decreasing.
Lemma 7.3 If there is a simple, ﬂat and D-eager proof of T  w then there is also
a simple, ﬂat, D-eager and ⊕-eager of T  w.
P. Lafourcade / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 37–5746
(DK2 )
(GX)
(R1)
...
T  B1
. . . (Rn)
...
T  Bn
T  {u}K1
T  K2
T  {u}K1\K2
⇓
(DK2\K1)
(DK2∩K1)
(GX)
(GX)
(R1)
...
T  B1
. . . (Rn1 )
...
T  Bn1
T  {u1}K1
. . . (GX)
(Rnl−1+1)
...
T  Bnl−1+1
. . . (Rnl )
...
T  Bnl
T  {ul}K1
T  {u1}K1 ⊕ . . .⊕ {ul}K1 = {u}K1
T  K2 ∩K1
T  {u}K1\K2∩K1
T  K2 \K1
T  {u}(K1\K2∩K1)\(K2\K1) = {u}K1\K2
⇓
(DK2\K1)
(GX)
(DK2∩K1)
(GX)
(R1)
...
T  B1
. . . (Rn1 )
...
T  Bn1
T  {u1}K1
T  K2 ∩K1
T  {u1}(K1\K2∩K1)
. . . (DK2∩K1)
(GX)
(Rnl−1+11)
...
T  Bnl−1+1
. . . (Rnl )
...
T  Bnl
T  {ul}K1
T  K2 ∩K1
T  {u1}(K1\K2∩K1)
T  {u}(K1\K2∩K1)
T  K2 \K1
T  {u}(K1\K2∩K1)\(K2\K1) = {u}K1\K2
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(GX)
(GX)
T  x1 . . . T  xn
T  x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn T  y1 . . . T  ym
T  x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn ⊕ y1 ⊕ . . .⊕ ym
⇓
(GX)
T  x1 . . . T  xn T  y1 . . . T  ym
T  x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xn ⊕ y1 ⊕ . . .⊕ ym
Fig. 3. Transformation of (GX)-(GX) into (GX)
Proof. Let P be a simple, ﬂat and D-eager proof of T  w, we apply many times
the proof transformation rules given in Figures 3 and 4. The application of these
transformations terminates because Proposition 7.2 shows that they decrease the
number of nodes of a proof and the transformation of a proof into a simple and ﬂat
proof decreases obviously the number of nodes. Moreover these transformations do
not make appear any rule (D) just after a rule (GX) and any rule (D) just after a
rule (C), hence the proof is again D-eager . 
8 Properties of Proofs
Thanks to previous transformations we consider a simple, ﬂat D-eager ⊕-eager proof
P of T  w. Lemma 8.2 shows, using Lemma 8.1, that all nodes stemmed from a rule
(UR)(UL) are in S(T ) for simple proof. Lemma 8.3 proves that all nodes stemmed
from a rule (D) have the encrypted hypothesis in S⊕(T ) for a simple, ﬂat, D-eager
and ⊕-eager proof. In Lemma 8.4 we prove that such a proof can be transformed
in a normal proof using Lemma 8.2 and Lemma 8.3.
Lemma 8.1 Let P be a simple proof of the form:
P =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
P1 . . . Pn
T  w
If T  u does not occur in any of P1, . . . , Pn and 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) then there is at least
one Pi and there exists w
′ such that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w′) and either the root of Pi is T  w
′
or w′ ∈ T .
Proof. We consider all possible rules for the root of P :
• The last rule is (A): obvious since all elements of T are normalized.
• The last rule is (UL) or (UR): 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) by hypothesis, we denote w′ =
〈u1, u2〉 and by construction w ∈ S(〈u1, u2〉). We deduce by transitivity of the
subterm relation that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w′) and conclude with the induction hypothesis.
• The last rule is (D): 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) by hypothesis, we denote w′ = {u1}u2 and by
construction w ∈ S({u1}u2). We deduce by transitivity of the subterm relation
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(GX)
(CK1 )
T  x1 T  K1
T  {x1}K1
(CK2 )
T  x2 T  K2
T  {x2}K2
(R1)
...
T  z1
. . .(Rm)
...
T  zm
T  {x1}K1 ⊕ {x2}K2 ⊕ z1 ⊕ . . .⊕ zm
⇓
(GX)
(CK1∩K2)
(GX)
(CK1\K2)
T  x1 T  K1 \K2
T  {x1}K1\K2
(CK2\K1)
T  x2 T  K2 \K1
T  {x2}K2\K1
T  {x1}K1\K2 ⊕ {x2}K2\K1
T  K1 ∩K2
T  {x1}K1 ⊕ {x2}K2 (R1)
...
T  z1
. . .(Rm)
...
T  zm
T  {x1}K1 ⊕ {x2}K2 ⊕ z1 ⊕ . . .⊕ zm
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that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w′) and conclude with the induction hypothesis.
• The last rule is (GX): 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) by hypothesis and w = (u1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ un) ↓.
Hence by deﬁnition of the subterm relation 〈u, v〉 ∈ ∪iS(ui), more precisely there
exists i such that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(ui), because 〈u, v〉 is not headed with ⊕ and conclude
with the induction hypothesis.
• The last rule is (P ): since T  u can not occur in P we have that w = 〈w1, w2〉 =
〈u, v〉. But 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) by hypothesis so 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(〈w1, w2〉). It is a subterm of
w1 or of w2 and we conclude with the induction hypothesis.
• The last rule is (C): We have that w = {w1}w2 = 〈u, v〉. But 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) by
hypothesis so 〈u, v〉 ∈ S({w1}w2). It is a subterm of w1 or of w2 and we conclude
with the induction hypothesis.

Lemma 8.2 Let P be a simple proof of T  u or T  v. If P is one of
(UL)
...
T  〈u, v〉
T  u
(UR)
...
T  〈u, v〉
T  v
then 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(T ).
Proof. Let us assume that the last rule is (UL), the case (UR) is similar.
P =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P1 . . . Pn
T  〈u, v〉
T  u
P is simple so T  u does not occur in any of P1, . . . , Pn. Hence, we can apply
Lemma 8.1 to
P1 . . . Pn
T  〈u, v〉
. Either 〈u, v〉 ∈ T , or there is some Pi with root T  w
such that 〈u, v〉 ∈ S(w) and T  u does not occur in Pi. Lemma 8.1 can be applied
again and the iteration of this reasoning ﬁnally leads to 〈u, v〉 ∈ T . 
Lemma 8.3 Let P be a simple, ﬂat, D-eager and ⊕-eager proof of T  u. If P is
(DK)
(R)
...
T  {u}K ↓ = r
...
T  K ↓
T  u
then {u}K ∈ S⊕(T ).
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on P .
Base case: obvious.
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Induction step: we perform a case analysis on the last rule (R) used in the
subproof of P with root {u}v ↓
• (R) is (A), (UL), (UR): the result is true by deﬁnition (rule (A)) or Lemma 8.2
(rule (UL), (UR)).
• (R) is some rule (P ): this cannot happen because {u}K ↓ is not a pair.
• (R) is some rule (CK ′): P is D-eager by consequence it is impossible.
• (R) is some rule (DK ′) impossible since P is ﬂat.
• (R) is (GX). The last deductions in the proof P are described in Figure 5 and we
discuss the diﬀerent cases according to the rules (Ri) and the structure of {u}K ↓.
(DK)
(GX)
(R1)
T  B1
T  B′1
... (Rn)
T  Bn
T  B′n
T  {u}K ↓
...
T  K ↓
T  u ↓
Fig. 5. Illustration of the case (DK) in Lemma 8.3.
We show that every atom of {u}K ↓ is in fact an element of ST (T ). Let a ∈
atoms({u}K ↓). Note that a is necessarily of the form {a
′}K , and that there is an
i such that a ∈ atoms(B′i). We consider diﬀerent possible cases for the rule (Ri):
· (Ri) is (A), (UL) or (UR). By deﬁnition or Lemma 8.2, B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ).
· (Ri) is (DK ′) s.t. (DK ′)
T  {w1}K ′ T  K
′
T  w1 = B
′
i
. By induction hypothesis {w1}K ′ ∈
S⊕(T ), therefore w1 = B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ).
· (Ri) is (P ): B
′
i = 〈w1, w2〉, B
′
i cannot occur in {u}K ↓ by consequence B
′
i is
canceled by another hypotheses B′j of (GX) such that B
′
i ∈ ST (B
′
j). B
′
j can not
be the result of a rule (P ) by simplicity, neither a rule (C) since it is a pair,
neither (GX) since the proof is ﬂat. In the other cases B′j stems from a rule (A),
(UL), (UR) or (D) by consequence B′j ∈ S⊕(T ). We deduce that B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ).
· (Ri) is (C), since P is D-eager we get that B
′
i is headed with {.}K ′ such that
K ∩K ′ = ∅. By consequence B′i is canceled by another hypotheses B
′
j of (GX)
such that B′j ∈ ST (B
′
i). B
′
j can not be the result of a rule (P ) since it is an
encrypted term, neither another rule (C) since P is ⊕-eager , neither (GX) since
the proof is ﬂat. In the other cases the copy B′j stems from a rule (A), (UL),
(UR) or (D) by consequence B′j ∈ S⊕(T ). We deduce that B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ).
Therefore in all cases {u}K ↓ =
⊕
i=1,...,n B
′
i ↓ =
⊕
{ti}K where {ti}K ∈ S⊕(T ) ∩
(∪i=1,...,natoms(Bi)) because all atoms of B
′
i are in S⊕(T ) or canceled.

Lemma 8.4 Let P be a ﬂat, simple, ⊕-eager and D-eager proof of T  u. There is
a normal proof of T  u.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case where u ∈ S⊕(T ). We proceed by structural induc-
tion on the proof P and case distinction of the last rule (R) of P :
• (R) is (A): P is obviously a normal proof.
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• (R) is some rule (UL) or (UR) s.t.
T  〈u1, u2〉
T  u
. The induction hypothesis gives
that there exists a normal proof of 〈u1, u2〉. P is simple, we apply Lemma 8.2 and
get 〈u1, u2〉 ∈ S(T ) ⊆ S⊕(T ) then the normal proof of 〈u1, u2〉 is S⊕(T )-local so
P is normal since u ∈ S⊕(T ).
• (R) is some rule (D) s.t.
T  {u}K T  K
T  u
. The induction hypothesis gives that
there exists a normal proof of {u}K . P is ﬂat, simple, D-eager and ⊕-eager with
Lemma 8.3 we get {u}K ∈ S(T ) ⊆ S⊕(T ) and then the normal proof of {u}K is
S⊕(T )-local so we deduce that P is normal because u ∈ S⊕(T ).
• (R) is some rule (P ), (C) are similar. We only give the proof for u = {u1}u2 .
(R) is some (C) s.t.
T  u1 T  u2
T  {u1}u2
Since {u1}u2 = u ∈ S⊕(T ) we deduce that
u1 ∈ S⊕(T ) and u2 ∈ S⊕(T ). Hence applying the induction hypothesis there are
normal proofs of u1 and u2 that are S⊕-local, hence P is normal.
• (R) is some rule (GX) s.t. (GX)
(R1)
T  B1
T  B′1
...(Rn)
T  Bn
T  B′n
T  u
. We will show
that for every (Ri) we have that B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ). We discuss the diﬀerent cases for
the rules (Ri)’s:
· (Ri) is not (GX) because P is ﬂat.
· (Ri) is (A), (UL), (UR) or (D) with the deﬁnition or Lemma 8.2 or Lemma 8.3
then B′i ∈ S⊕(T ). Applying the induction hypothesis there is a normal proof of
B′i which is S⊕(T )-local.
· (Ri) is (P ), there are two possibilities: B
′
i is in ST (u) or not.
B′i ∈ ST (u) ⊆ S⊕(T ) we can apply the induction hypothesis and get a normal
proof of B′i which is S⊕(T )-local.
B′i ∈ ST (u) hence B
′
i is canceled by some other elements B
′
j . B
′
j can not
come from a rule (P ) because P is simple, from a rule (C) because a pair is
not headed with {.}.. So B
′
j come from a rule (A), (UL), (UR) or (D) with
the deﬁnition or Lemma 8.2 or Lemma 8.3 then B′j ∈ S⊕(T ). More precisely⊕
B′j ∈ S⊕(T ), since B
′
i ∈ S⊕(
⊕
B′j), we deduce that B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ). We apply
the induction hypothesis and get a normal proof of B′i which is S⊕(T )-local.
· (Ri) is (CK), this case is similar to the previous case. There are two possibilities:
B′i is in ST (u) or not:
B′i ∈ ST (u) ⊆ S⊕(T ), we apply the induction hypothesis and get a normal
proof of B′i which is S⊕(T )-local.
B′i ∈ ST (u) hence B
′
i is canceled by some other elements B
′
j . B
′
j can not stem
from a rule (P ) since a pair is not headed with {.}., from a rule (CK ′) with
K ′ = K since B′i not headed with {.}K and not from another rule (CK ′) where
K ′ ∩K = ∅ since P is ⊕-eager . So B′j come from a rule (A), (UL), (UR) or
(D) with the deﬁnition or Lemma 8.2 or Lemma 8.3 then B′j ∈ S⊕(T ). More
precisely
⊕
B′j ∈ S⊕(T ), since B
′
i ∈ S⊕(
⊕
B′j) we deduce that B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ).
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we can apply the induction hypothesis and get a normal proof of B′i which is
S⊕(T )-local.
Since all the subproofs of T  B′i are normal we can conclude that P is normal.
In the second case, we assume that u ∈ S⊕(T ) and the proof is of the form
C[P1, . . . , Pn] where P1, . . . , Pn are maximal S⊕-local subproofs. We prove the result
by structural induction on P :
• If C is empty, then u ∈ S⊕(T )
• If the last rule is (UL), (UR) or (D) we use the deﬁnition and Lemma 8.2 and
Lemma 8.3 to get u ∈ S⊕(T ).
• In the others cases we apply the induction hypothesis.

9 Our Main Result
In this section, we prove Theorem 9.1 which says that a normal proof is equiv-
alent to a S⊕(T,w)-proof. Thanks to Theorem 4.2 we conclude that there is a
DOUBLE-EXP-TIME procedure to decide the intruder deduction problem in equa-
tional theory XCDE(complexity due to the computation of the set S⊕(T,w)).
Theorem 9.1 Let P be a ﬂat, simple, D-eager and ⊕-eager proof of T  w then
P is normal ⇔ P is S⊕(T,w)-local.
Proof. ⇐ Let us assume that P is S⊕(T,w)-local and prove that P is normal:
• If w ∈ S⊕(T ) then P is S⊕(T )-local i.e. P is normal.
• If w ∈ S⊕(T ) then we proceed by structural induction on P . The base case (A)
is trivial, consider the last rule:
· (UR), (UL), (D) impossible since Lemma 8.2 and Lemma 8.3 show that w ∈
S⊕(T ) which contradicts the hypothesis.
· (P ), (C), (GX) by induction hypothesis, the hypotheses wi of the rule stem
from normal proofs. Because the last rule is (P ), (C), (GX) then P is normal.
⇒ Let us assume that P is normal and prove that P is S⊕(T,w)-local:
• If w ∈ S⊕(T ): P is S⊕(T )-local, hence P is S⊕(T,w)-local.
• If w ∈ S⊕(T ) we proceed by structural induction on P . The base case is trivial,
consider the last rule:
· (UR), (UL), (D): impossible by deﬁnition of normal proof.
· (P ), (C) are similar, we just give the proof for (C). P is s.t.
T  w1 T  w2
T  {w1}w2
.
By deﬁnition for i = 1, 2 wi ∈ S⊕(T,wi), wi ∈ ST ({w1}w2) = ST (w) ⊆ S⊕(w),
and induction hypothesis which guarantees that all nodes of the sub-proof are
in S⊕(T,wi), we conclude that P is S⊕(T,w)-local.
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· (GX) P is s.t. (GX)
(R1)
T  B1
T  B′1
. . . (Rn)
T  Bn
T  B′n
T  w
. We will prove that
all B′i are in S⊕(T,w), consider the diﬀerent cases for the (Ri):
(A): by deﬁnition B′i ∈ S⊕(T ),
(UR), (UL), (D): by Lemma 8.2 and Lemma 8.3 we get B′i ∈ S⊕(T ).
(GX): impossible because P is ﬂat.
(P ): if B′i ∈ S⊕(T ) the claim holds, otherwise B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ). Either B
′
i is not
canceled in a sum, then B′i ∈ ST (w) ⊆ S⊕(w), or otherwise B
′
i is canceled by
another element of the sum B′j. Since B
′
i is a pair B
′
j can not be deduced from
a rule (C) neither a rule (P ) since P is simple. Hence it stems from one of the
rules (A), (UL), (UR) or (D) and B′i ∈ ST (B
′
j). According to Lemma 8.2 and
Lemma 8.3 B′j ∈ S⊕(T ), hence we get the result by transitivity of S⊕.
(CK): if B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ) the claim holds, otherwise B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T ). Note that B
′
i can
be partially canceled in a sum. There are two possibilities for the atoms of B′i:
to be present in w, in which case atoms(B′i) ∈ atoms(ST (w)) ⊆ atoms(S⊕(w)),
or to be canceled by other elements B′j of the sum, in which case atoms(B
′
i) ∈
atoms(S⊕(B
′
j)) ⊆ atoms(S⊕(T )). In the latter case, since B
′
i is encrypted by
the set of keys K, B′j can not be the result of a rule (CK ′) with K
′ = K, nor the
result of the rule (C ′K) with K
′ ∩K = ∅ since P is ⊕-eager , nor (P ), hence it
stems from one of the rules (A), (UL), (UR) or (D). Thanks to Lemma 8.2 and
Lemma 8.3 B′j ∈ S⊕(T ), we conclude with the transitivity of S⊕. In summary,
for all i we get that atoms(B′i) ∈ atoms(S⊕(T,w)), that is B
′
i ∈ S⊕(T,w)).
Hence P is S⊕(T,w)-local.

10 The Binary Case
We call the binary case the situation where the set of assumptions T and the goal
u of the proof P of T  u do not contain terms with more than two consecutive
applications of the symbol ⊕.
In the case of a commuting encryption operation, we show an EXPSPACE lower
bound by reduction of the uniform word problem in commutative semigroups (ab-
breviated CSG) which is EXPSPACE-hard [16]. An instance of CSG is:
α1 = β1, . . . , αn = βn |= α = β
where α, β, αi and βi are words over some alphabet. It is essential for the complexity
of the problem that the alphabet is inﬁnite (of course, any instance C of CSG uses
only a ﬁnite portion Σ(C ) of that alphabet). Such an instance of CSG has a solution
if and only if α = β in every commutative semigroup satisfying the axioms αi = βi.
Denoting by x =c y the equality of two words x and y modulo commutativity, this
is equivalent to the following assertion:
Either α =c β, or there exists a sequence of pairs (γ1, δ1), . . . , (γl, δl) such that
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each pair (γj , δj) is either some αi = βi or some βi = αi
and a sequence of words c1, . . . , cl with cj ∈ Σ(C )
∗ such that
α =c γ1c1 , δ1c1 =c γ2c2, . . . , δl−1cl−1 =c γlcl , δlcl =c β
We consider asymmetric encryption to prove the hardness result in the binary
case, i.e a term {u}k can be decrypted if and only if we know the inverse of the
key k, denoted Inv(k). We just need to add the Inv symbol in the signature and
modify the decryption rule:
(DK)
T  {u}K T  Inv(K)
T  u ↓
where K is the non-empty multi-set {kα11 , . . . , k
αn
n }, Inv(K) is a notation for the
multi-set {Inv(k1)
α1 , . . . , Inv(kn)
αn}, and as previously T  Inv(K) denotes many
times the sequent of each inverse keys. Notice if you do not know an inverse of a
key, there is no way to generate it. In this case we have also the locality result.
Theorem 10.1 In case of the equational theory XCDE the binary intruder deduc-
tion problem is EXPSPACE-hard.
Proof. We show that this is even true for binary T , u not containing any decryption
key as a subterm (i.e. there is no symbol Inv) and any term headed with the pair
function.
Given an instance C = (α1 = β1, . . . , αn = βn |= α = β) of CSG, let
T = {{*}αi ⊕ {*}βi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ Σ(C )
u= {*}α ⊕ {*}β
where * is some constant, and all the symbols of Σ(C ) are considered as constants.
By locality Theorem 9.1 we know that all nodes of the proofs of T  u are in
the set of subterms of T ∪{u}. Hence these proofs are not using the (D) rule (since
no decryption key is a subterm of T or u) and not the rules (UR), (UL) and (P )
because there is no term headed with the pair function in T ∪ {u}. By consequence
theses proofs contains only the rules (A), (C) and (GX).
(CK)
(GX)
T  x1 . . . T  xn
T  x1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ xn T  K
T  {x1}K ⊕ . . .⊕ {xn}K
⇓
(GX)
(CK)
T  x1 T  K
T  {x1}K
. . . (CK)
T  xn T  K
T  {xn}K
T  {x1}K ⊕ . . . ⊕ {xn}K
Fig. 6. Permutation of the rules (GX)-(C) into (C)-(GX).
Applying the transformations of the Figure 3 (merge of two (GX) rules) and
Figure 6 (switch rules (GX) and (C)), existence of such a proof is equivalent to
P. Lafourcade / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 171 (2007) 37–57 55
existence of a proof of the following form:
(GX)
(C)
(C)
(A)
{*}γ1 ⊕ {*}δ1 ∈ T
T  {*}γ1 ⊕ {*}δ1
...
T  {*}γ1c1 ⊕ {*}δ1c1
. . . (C)
(C)
(A)
{*}γl ⊕ {*}δl ∈ T
T  {*}γl ⊕ {*}δl
...
T  {*}γlcl ⊕ {*}δlcl
T  {*}α ⊕ {*}β
where we may assume without loss of generality that no non-empty subset of the
premises of the (GX) rule sums up to 0. There exists such a proof if either {*}α =
{*}β, or if there exists a sequence of terms {*}γ1⊕{*}δ1 , . . . , {*}γl⊕{*}δl such that
each of them is either some {*}αi ⊕ {*}βi or some {*}βi ⊕ {*}αi , and a sequence
c1, . . . , cl such that:
{*}α = {*}γ1c1 , {*}δ1c1 = {*}γ2c2 , . . . , {*}δl−1cl−1 = {*}γlcl, {*}δlcl = {*}β
in the term algebra, which is equivalent to the existence of a solution to C . The
claim follows from the EXPSPACE-hardness of CSG [16]. 
11 Conclusion
We propose a DOUBLE-EXP-TIME decision procedure for solving the intruder
deduction problem in presence of the equational theory XCDE (eXclusive-or with a
Commutative and Distributive Encryption). The commutativity of the encryption
requires to consider all combinations of keys in the subterms, to be more attentive
and to develop a new normalization of proof. We also prove in the binary case that
this problem is EXPSPACE-hard. The next stage will be to ﬁnd the exact complexity
of this problem. The intruder deduction problem is the ﬁrst step in the veriﬁcation
of cryptographic protocols as for instance in [18] without any equational theory, or
later in [6,3] to consider the equational theory of exclusive-or. The second step is
verifying the case of an active intruder. The active case without equational theory
but with a commutative encryption was shown to be decidable by [5]. We prove that
the problem is decidable for an active intruder with a homomorphic operation which
is not the encryption [11]. In the case of the equational theory of the exclusive-or
and non-commutative distributive encryption over this operator, it seems impossible
to solve the equations systems in the usual way. But after having studied the ﬁrst
step by demonstrating the intruder deduction problem in the XCDE case, we could
apply some mathematical results for solving these equations systems.
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